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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the discursive production and employment of, what Irish 
politicians term, ‘commonsense citizenship’ as a means of addressing and regulating 
new immigration to Ireland, and in re-defining Irishness and Irish citizenship 
(culminating in a national Citizenship referendum in June 2004).  We argue that 
commonsense citizenship is employed in such a way as to fix and essentialise 
Irishness, thus highlighting the threatening other, and to construct immigrants as 
suspect, untrustworthy, and deserving of Ireland’s ‘hospitality’ only in limited, 
prescribed ways or not at all.  Through examining six troubling paradoxes we reveal 
slippages, contradictions and nuances that commonsense citizenship works to deny 
and erase, but nevertheless work to undermine its essentialism and injustices.  In so 
doing, we argue these paradoxes open ways to rethink Irish citizenship, and how such 
a notion is produced discursively.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In his book Global Me Zachary champions Ireland as an excellent example of 
a harmonised, cosmopolitan, multicultural country, with immigrants “adding diversity 
and lifting the Irish economy to new heights” (2000:161).  And yet, in a referendum 
held in June 2004, the Irish electorate voted by a margin of four to one for a change in 
the definition of Irish citizenship to deal with the perceived problems associated with 
immigration, particularly those linked to refugees and asylum seekers. Prior to the 
referendum, any child born on the island of Ireland had an automatic right to Irish 
citizenship – this right was enshrined in the Irish Constitution. As a consequence of 
the referendum, the right to citizenship by birth was removed from the Constitution, 
and Irish citizenship is now primarily defined by blood ties.  
 
 The Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell (of the Progressive Democrats 
party -PDs), described the referendum as “both rational and necessary”. There is, he 
wrote: “a steady stream of people coming to Ireland, both legally and illegally, so as 
to ensure that their children avail of our present law so as to secure the entitlement to 
Irish citizenship.”1 The referendum would ensure, he argued, that Ireland could 
“manage migration into the State in a sensible and proper fashion” (McDowell 2004. 
His remarks were echoed by Fianna Fáil, the largest political party in Ireland, and 
ruling coalition partners with the PDs. The party urged the electorate to support the 
referendum: their campaign posters read “Vote Yes for Common Sense Citizenship”.  
For supporters of the referendum, it was commonsense that the ‘loophole’ granting 
Irish citizenship by birth would be closed, thus ensuring that access to Irish 
citizenship and Irishness would be available only to ‘legitimate’, ‘authentic’ and 
‘deserving’ parties. 
 
The calls for commonsense citizenship, and the comprehensive endorsement 
of those calls by the electorate, need to be placed in the context of a rapid change in 
migration patterns to Ireland. Since the 1990s Ireland has become, for the first time in 
modern history, a country of net immigration. In the period from 1995 to 2004, 
486,300 people moved to the Republic of Ireland. In the same period, 263,800 people 
emigrated, resulting in net immigration of 222,500 (See Table 1). The Central 
Statistics Office reported, in September 2004, that the population of Ireland had 
exceeded four million for the first time since 1871. Reasons for this recent growth in 
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immigration to Ireland are complex, but include Ireland’s economic strength (the 
‘Celtic Tiger’ era), the Northern Ireland ceasefires, and EU enlargement in 2004.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Growing numbers of immigrants is not in itself an unusual phenomenon in a 
wealthy Western country. Yet Ireland is crucially different from many Western 
countries because of its long experience of emigration. Throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Ireland was a net exporter of people. Millions of Irish people – 
thousands within each generation – fled poverty and social repression to seek work 
and new lives abroad, thus creating a large, global diaspora. The extent of emigration 
led geographer Jim MacLaughlin, writing just over ten years ago, to describe Ireland 
as an ‘emigrant nursery’ (MacLaughlin 1994). Despite recent economic growth in 
Ireland, significant numbers still emigrate from the country annually, and Irish 
politicians and the Catholic Church continue to be active in lobbying on behalf of the 
thousands of undocumented Irish immigrants currently living in the United States. 
Irish identity has thus traditionally been associated with the act of migration. As 
writer Polly Devlin commented, “emigration was a big sad Irish word in every sense 
… We were all poised on the point of eternal emigration” (in Logue 2000: 42). 
Despite this, Ireland’s emigrant past and present is often conveniently forgotten in the 
rush to regulate and restrict immigration, and to assert ‘commonsense citizenship.’  
 
In this paper, we examine the nature of ‘commonsense citizenship’. We argue 
that ‘commonsense citizenship’ seeks to fix notions of Ireland and Irishness, and to 
define who can be Irish, predominantly on the basis of blood ties and shared cultural 
heritage. In this way, ‘commonsense citizenship’ is deployed as an essentialising tool 
to define and draw a distinctive boundary between Irish citizens and (certain) 
immigrants, working to erase the fluid, relational and contested production of 
Irishness. This fixing is, we contend, inherently unstable, creating a series of 
paradoxes that expose the contradictions, hypocrisy, selective memory, nationalism 
and racism that it simultaneously uses and hides. Mapping out and deconstructing 
these paradoxes reveals the contingent, relational, contested and contradictory nature 
of commonsense Irishness, as well as the political potential of the diversity of 
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Ireland’s reaction to immigrants.  While we focus on Ireland, our analysis has 
parallels for understanding debates around immigration and citizenship elsewhere. 
 
COMMONSENSE CITIZENSHIP 
Following T.H. Marshall’s classic text Citizenship and Social Class (1950), 
citizenship is often seen to contest three sets of rights – civil/legal, political, and social 
– that define the status of an individual within a state. As Richardson (1998: 84) 
summarises: 
‘Civil or legal rights are institutionalised through the law and include things 
such as the right to own property; freedom of speech, thought and faith; liberty 
of the person and the right to justice.  Political rights are institutionalised in 
the parliamentary political system and councils of local government and 
include the right to vote and participate in the exercise of political power.  
Social rights include the right to a certain level of economic welfare and 
security’.   
Through being citizens of a state individuals gain entitlements to these rights.  As a 
consequence state citizenship, and the granting of citizenship or equivalent 
recognition (e.g., that citizens of other states are entitled to certain rights), takes on 
enormous significance for immigrants new to a state.  Equally, the defining and 
regulation of citizenship becomes a concern to a state and its existing citizens if it is 
seen to come under threat.  Given large, worldwide immigration, especially from the 
Global South to the minority North, state citizenship is perceived to be under threat in 
many countries, especially in the EU and North America. As a consequence, states 
have sought to tighten up legal entitlements to asylum and citizenship and to enact 
more rigorous screening procedures at border crossings, thus regulating and 
restricting the flow of immigrants across borders. These measures have been justified 
through discourses that draw on ideas of legitimacy and authenticity, themselves 
shaped by nationalism and (often implicit) racism, and which fuel moral panics that 
threaten immigrants ‘stealing’ jobs, leeching the welfare system, and radically altering 
in negative ways national cultures and ways of life.  Such discourses are often 
portrayed as ‘commonsense’ – it is rational and logical to protect a state’s economy 
and culture in ways that benefit existing citizens. 
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This has certainly been the case in Ireland, where ‘Common Sense 
Citizenship’ formed the bedrock slogan for the ‘Yes’ campaign in the June 2004 
citizenship referendum.  We would argue that the appeal to commonsense in the 
lobbying of voters had a number of powerful discursive effects.  First, by appealing to 
commonsense, the ‘Yes’ campaign sought to stunt accusations of racism or 
xenophobia.  Voting ‘Yes’ was not about discriminating against immigrants, it was 
about protecting and benefiting Ireland through the long term protection of culture 
(stopping the dilution and erasure of Irishness) and economy (workers could be sent 
back if the economy had a downturn).   Second, commonsense citizenship worked to 
focus on the present – the here and now – casting as irrelevant Ireland’s own history 
of emigration and anti-Irish racism.  The referendum was about the future, not the 
past; the past after all being a foreign country.  It was therefore commonsense for 
people to vote to shape and protect their future in ways that ignored earlier 
generations’ experiences as immaterial to the contemporary context. Third, 
commonsense understandings of immigration worked to undermine the legitimacy of 
a range of immigrants – guest workers, asylum seekers and refugees – by questioning 
their authenticity and by generalising their motivations and experiences. The 
discursive construction and denigration of refugees, asylum seekers and ‘economic 
migrants’ as bogus, spongers, or economic parasites cast doubt on their right to stay in 
Ireland and claim citizenship for themselves and their children. Fourth, commonsense 
worked to (re)define and fix notions of Irishness.  On the one hand, there was an 
appeal to a national, shared culture, and on the other Irishness was defined by blood 
ties and a rooted legacy in Ireland.  To be Irish, one had to have grown up in Ireland 
or the Irish diaspora, and therefore be assimilated to the ‘Irish way of life’ or one’s 
parents had to be Irish.  Of course, the latter often ensures the former.  Commonsense 
therefore cast culture and identity in essentialist terms – as having inherent 
characteristics – rather than seeing Irishness as something constructed or performed; 
diverse, contingent, relation and constantly in the process of formation.  This 
essentialist notion of Irishness therefore worked to create an exclusive, universal, 
rationale category, difficult to challenge due to its commonsensical nature.  In doing 
so, it sought to unite anyone who considered themselves Irish against others through 
an appeal to a common cultural and genetic heritage, and thus erase differences in 
culture and opinion amongst the populace.  
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Despite the appeals of commonsense citizenship and its rationalities, we 
would argue that there is nothing commonsensical about the complex issues on which 
the electorate were being asked to vote.  Irishness is diverse, fluid and contested, and 
the motivations and experiences of immigrants vary considerably.  Commonsense 
citizenship sought to straightjacket both and to create a simple, appealing narrative.  
In doing so, however, commonsense citizenship created a series of paradoxes, six of 
which we discuss in the remainder of the paper: (1) Ireland has always been 
multicultural, yet Irish society is represented as homogenous and monocultural; (2)  
in-migration is resisted, yet Ireland’s history is dominated by emigration and it still 
continues to export people; (3) 
 economic migrants invest in Ireland, but have limited benefit from such 
investment; (4) the Irish are both the perpetrators and victims of racism; (5) most 
immigrants are white, but most discourses about migration present immigrants as 
black; (6) policies to combat racism and promote inclusiveness co-exist with policies 
that promote the exclusion of asylum seekers using racist ideology.  These paradoxes 
are important, we believe, because they cleave open the simple, essentialist narrative 
of commonsense citizenship, revealing how it works to create a very particular and 
selective political narrative.  Simultaneously, they open ways to rethink Irish 
citizenship, and how such a notion is produced discursively. 
 
PARADOX I: IRELAND WAS AND IS MULTUCULTURAL, YET IS OFTEN 
REPRESENTED AS HOMOGENOUS AND MULTICULTURAL 
The notion of a monocultural, homogenous community – white, Gaelic, and 
Catholic – formed a central part of Irish Free State discourse from its inception. The 
‘imagined community’ that emerged relied on a simplified and highly restrictive 
version of Irishness. Edna Longley wrote that “masses of cultural expression – 
alternative realities, virtually alternative countries – were ignored while the Free 
State/Republic fetishised ‘Irishness’” (Longley 2001:9). A number of organisations 
and institutions were crucial to the construction of this version of Irishness. These 
included the Catholic Church, republican parties, the Irish language crusade, and the 
Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). The “special position” of the Catholic Church 
was recognised in the Irish Constitution, the official status of the Irish language was 
established, politicians promulgated a vision of rural Ireland as the purest form of 
Irishness, and the GAA, with its ban on ‘foreign games’ (such as rugby and soccer), 
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promoted a highly popular, nationalistic vision of sports (Ferriter 2004). Together, 
these and other organisations and institutions – through politics, religion, sporting and 
social life – have been instrumental in attempting to exclude ‘non-conforming’ 
cultures from definitions of ‘Irishness’, and in constructing a version of Irishness that 
highlights Catholicism, nationalism and cultural homogeneity, underpinned by an 
assumed whiteness. The resulting consensus served to undermine civil and political 
rights “by the generalisation of disciplinary techniques and the elimination of 
difference and distinctiveness” (Dean 1994:183). It also served to mask the State’s 
failure to reflect more deeply on Ireland’s cultural differences, and to actively militate 
against the denigration and/or oppression of people and cultural practices that did not 
fit in with accepted stereotypes.  
 
However, the Irish State is, and has been since its foundation, a multicultural 
state. Irish citizens have been and are of different races, ethnicities and religions, with 
other variances along lines of gender, class, sexuality, ablebodiness and so on. Some 
recent academic texts have highlighted this, and have introduced complexity into 
discourses of Irish identity (see, for example, Brown 1985; Kiberd 1995; Cullen 2000; 
Longley and Kiberd 2001; Loyal 2003). Among the axes of differentiation that have 
been examined are religion, gender, race, ethnicity, class and sexuality. Current 
examples include the work of Rolston and Shannon (2002) and Garner (2004) on race 
and racism in Ireland; forthcoming work by Ó Grada which provides a rich social and 
economic history of Ireland’s Jewish communities; ongoing research by Crowley on 
the history of Travellers; and Kitchin and Lysaght’s (2004) tracing out of the 
discursive formation of Irish sexuality. Other critical work highlights the extent of 
dissent from the prevailing orthodoxy, suggesting that many Irish citizens disrupted 
and challenged organisational and institutional attempts at personal and national 
regulation (see Ferriter 2004 for a broad-ranging account of many of these acts of 
resistance).  
 
Commonsense citizenship in the Irish context bases one of its claims to 
legitimacy on a common cultural heritage that relies on shared religious, cultural and 
political practices. Validating this claim involves a denial of the kinds of differences 
that exist – for example, different religious practices, different races and ethnicities, 
and different sexualities – as well as a denial of the historical and ongoing struggles 
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over the meanings of Ireland and Irishness. Recognition of Ireland’s long experience 
of multiculturalism challenges the power of representations of Ireland as homogenous 
and monocultural, and creates possibilities for other, more inclusive understandings of 
Irishness. 
 
PARADOX II. IRELAND RESISTS IN-MIGRATION, WHILE 
TRADITIONALLY BEING AN EMIGRANT COUNTRY 
For the two centuries prior to the present period of immigration, Ireland has 
been a net exporter of people. This can be inferred from Tables 2 and 3, which show 
the population of Ireland from 1821 to 2002, and net migration rates from 1951 to 
1994. As recently as the 1980s and early 1990s, several thousands were emigrating on 
an annual basis. As a consequence of many decades of substantial migration from 
Ireland, millions worldwide now claim Irish ancestry – as members of the ‘Irish 
Diaspora.’ Migration from Ireland has peaked periodically, usually connected to 
difficult economic, social and political periods in the country. Periods of significant 
out-migration include the years immediately following the Great Famine, the 1950s 
and the 1980s. For example, it is estimated that over 600,000 people emigrated from 
Ireland (26 counties) in the period from 1851 to 1855 (Miller 1985:570). By 1961, 
there were over 750,000 people of Irish birth living in Britain (Ferriter 2004:75). 
Between 1987 and 1996, the Central Statistics Office estimates that over 430,000 
people emigrated from Ireland, peaking in 1989 when over 70,000 people – 2% of the 
population – left the country. The process continues today, with roughly 20,000 
people – the majority under 25 years of age – emigrating annually (CSO).  
 
<Tables 2 and 3 about here> 
 
 Dominant discourses about migration from Ireland focus on its almost 
obligatory nature. Kerby Miller, writing of post-famine emigration, argued that Irish 
emigrants saw themselves “not as voluntary, ambitious emigrants but as involuntary, 
nonresponsible ‘exiles’, compelled to leave home by forces beyond individual 
control” (Miller 1985:56). Narratives of compulsion were exacerbated by accounts of 
the experiences of Irish migrants in their new homes. For example, Catholic Irish 
migrants to the antebellum US were described as  “low-browed and savage, 
grovelling and bestial, lazy and wild, simian and sensual” (Roediger 1999:133. See 
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also Ignatiev 1995; Rolston 2003). Often the targets of nativist groups such as the 
American Protestant Society and the Know Nothing Party (Miller 1985:323-324), 
these Irish migrants were poor, lowly, had limited rights, and were the victims of 
pervasive racism. Many migrants to Britain faced a similarly hostile reception. 
Historically, Irish migrants to Britain were characterized as simian (Curtis 1997) and 
associated with dirt and disease and poverty: Engels, for example, described Irish 
immigrants in Britain as bringing with them “filth and intemperance”, and as being 
“uncivilized” and abjectly poor (Engels 1958:104-107).  More recently Hickman and 
Walter commented that, while racial harassment of Irish people is “underreported and 
largely unrecognised”, many Irish in Britain have experienced harassment: from 
neighbours, from the police force, and from far-right groups like the British National 
Party (1997:123). Irish people in Britain have also commented on the impacts of 
racial stereotyping, and of the use of gate keeping practices to exclude Irish people 
from equal access to services provided by statutory authorities (Hickman and Walter 
1997:115). Irish migrants and their descendants are more likely to be members of 
lower social classes, to suffer from ill-health, and to live in sub-standard 
accommodation than most other ethnic and racial groups in Britain (Hickman and 
Walter 1997:36-62). 
  
It is then deeply ironic that Ireland is actively and aggressively seeking to 
delimit (see Section 3) and resist immigration to Ireland given its own emigrants’ 
experiences.  And yet, despite the seeming paradox that Ireland has forgotten its own 
peoples’ immigrant plight, perhaps the present strategy to control immigration should 
come as no surprise for three reasons.  First, Ireland has a long history of planned 
emigration (e.g., migrations to Spain in the sixteenth century; schemes to assist 
unemployed and poor to migrate to North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries; the assistance of pregnant women to travel to Britain in the twentieth 
century) and immigration (e.g., Protestant in-migration in the seventeenth century; the 
acceptance of very limited numbers of asylum seekers from Hungary in 1956; Chile 
1973; Vietnam 1979; Bosnia 1990s) (see Duffy 2004; Fanning 2002).  Then, as now, 
the aim was to aid selected groups to either leave or come to Ireland under specific 
conditions. 
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Second, Ireland, as a member of the European Union, is under pressure from 
other states to fulfil its role in maintaining ‘Fortress Europe’.  In other words, Ireland 
is being pressured to bring its immigration policies in line with other EU states and to 
close off any ‘back doors’ into Europe.  This line of argument was used (amongst 
others) by the state to urge voters to vote ‘yes’ in the recent citizenship referendum.  
In playing the European card, those in favour of stronger regulation can deny 
allegations of racism or xenophobia or nationalism, instead arguing that they are 
playing their part in a wider, continental project. 
 
Third, and discussed in the fourth section, Ireland and the Irish have never 
been immune from racist ideologies and from the practice of racism, whether being 
expressed in relation to indigenous Travellers or other groups. It should come as no 
surprise to see racism and xenophobia mobilised in debates about who should be 
allowed to migrate to, work in, and become citizens of Ireland. 
 
That said, while these three reasons provide some explanation as to the erasure 
of history, they excuse rather deny the paradox.  Indeed, we find the selective memory 
of the present Irish government deeply troubling.  The periods of suffering, 
emigration, and the diaspora and its experiences are drawn on continually in the 
construction of Irish identity, yet these self-same histories are simultaneously 
forgotten as new boundaries are fashioned to define Irish citizenship.  And yet, none 
of these three reasons has a teleological inevitability; they are not predestined.  Rather 
they are contingent and relational discursive formations which means they can 
challenged and reformulated in ways that recognises the Irish experience of 
emigration, and which makes easier the lives of immigrants to Ireland.  
 
PARADOX III: ECONOMIC MIGRANTS INVEST IN IRELAND, BUT HAVE 
LIMITED BENEFIT FROM SUCH INVESTMENT  
The rapid growth in the Irish economy throughout the 1990s and into the new 
century has meant that labour market demand exceeds what the Irish labour market 
can supply. In response, the Irish government has actively sought to encourage 
migrant workers to move to Ireland. However, the movement of migrant labour 
emanating from outside of the EU is highly regulated and the rules governing 
movement subject to rapid change depending on labour market conditions.  The 
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government is actively controlling who can work in Ireland, in what sectors and at 
what times, with respect to their country of origin and skills. In so doing, it excludes 
certain migrants from coming to Ireland, and it provides many migrant workers with 
limited rights and denies them the opportunity of staying long term.   
 
To attract and regulate labour migration the government has formulated and 
implemented an economic migration policy.  This consists of two strands: the 
Working Visa/Work Authorisation (WV/WA) programme administered by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Work Permits scheme administered by the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE).  These schemes, while 
complementary, target different people with differing skills. The WV/WA programme 
targets high skill, well educated workers required for the information technology, 
medical and construction sectors (DETE 2004a).  The Work Permits scheme targets 
lower skilled workers, from outside the European Economic Area (EU, plus Norway, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and under a separate agreement Switzerland), needed in the 
service sectors, catering, agriculture, industry, nursing, and domestic home help (see 
Table 4).  Under the Work Permits scheme, 47,551 people were admitted to work in 
Ireland in 2003, and 34,067 in 2004 (see Table 5). 
 
<Tables 4 and 5 about here> 
 
The schemes clearly make assumptions about the desirability and treatment of 
different labour migrants.  The WV/WA is a fast-track programme where the migrant 
worker applies for a visa/authorisation through the Irish embassy in their country.  
The Work Permits scheme cannot be applied to by a migrant. Instead, the prospective 
employer applies (after demonstrating that posts cannot be filled from the Irish labour 
pool), with the permit held by the employer not the worker (DETE 2004b).  This 
means that the worker is tied to that site of work and cannot seek work elsewhere, 
creating a large power differential that has clearly been exploited in some cases.2  
Workers do not have the right to free medical care, education or social welfare 
entitlements.  They can be joined by their family after three months residence.  In 
contrast, WV/WA workers can change their employers within the same skills category 
as long as they continue to have permission to work and reside in the country (DETE 
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2004c).  Asylum seekers and those applying for refugee status are not entitled to work 
regardless of their skills and needs. 
 
While workers under the WV/WA programme are clearly seen as desirable, 
those under the Work Permits programme are seen as merely a means to an end.  Such 
workers are not viewed as part of the long-term population of Ireland and indeed 
possess no rights to stay.  Permit holders are typically from Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (with strong representation from Belarus, Moldova, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey and Ukraine),3 English-speaking nations such as Australia, Canada, 
US and South Africa, and countries such as Philippines, China, Brazil, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, India and Malaysia (see Table 6).  Our assessment is that there are clear 
nationalistic and racist ideologies at work here that are used to underpin desirability 
and to delimit future potential citizenship.  Indeed, the system is set up so that migrant 
workers can give to the state, and contribute to its social and economic life, but are 
entitled to nothing beyond a wage.  Given the waves of labour emigrants from Ireland 
who became citizens of the countries they helped forge (and created the much 
celebrated Irish Diaspora) these systems of regulation reek of hypocrisy.  
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
PARADOX IV: IRISH AS PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS OF RACISM 
 
Ireland and the Irish occupy a complex and contradictory position with regards 
to racist ideologies and the practices of racism.  As noted above, the Irish have long 
been the victims of racism, both in Ireland as expressed by the British, colonial power 
and its institutions, and in the countries to which the Irish emigrated – notably the 
British empire states (UK, Australia, Canada) and the USA, particularly in the 
nineteenth century (Ignatiev 1995).  Paradoxically, Irish people have been involved in 
racist practices in Ireland and elsewhere. This is especially evident in the Irish 
involvement in empire, as Irish soldiers, administrators, missionaries and settlers 
aided the British in their global civilizing and subjugating efforts, but it is also evident 
in the treatment of race and of racial and ethnic minorities in Ireland. These 
generalizations mask paradoxes in all of these sites: some Irish prospered in Britain, 
some Irish were involved in anti-racist movements in Ireland and the US, and some 
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Irish fought for independence from Britain on behalf of other colonies, just as others 
bolstered the colonial relationship. 
 
The Irish have been described as “enthusiastic co-partners and beneficiaries in 
the British imperial enterprise” (Cleary 2003:22), and as the ideal “prefabricated 
collaborators” (Akenson, in Bielenberg 2000b:228). Accounts of Irish enthusiasm for 
the imperial project suggest, for example, that most Irish households in Montserrat 
were slave-owning (in Bielenberg  2000b:216), or that many Irish soldiers and 
administrators in India had a reputation for being brutal (Holmes 2000:235-239). 
James Joyce satirisies these eager imperialists in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man (2000:176-177).4 Yet, just as some Irish were willing servants of empire, others 
fought against empire. Irish women played an important role in Indian independence 
and feminist movements, for example, and Irish men fought against the British during 
the Boer War in South Africa (Holmes 2000: 243; McCracken 2000: 265-266).5 The 
role of Irish Catholic missionaries is similarly complicated. While undoubtedly 
contributing to the ‘civilizing’ endeavour of colonialism, these missionaries 
potentially provided an alternative world view to that of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism: 
Edward Hogan claims that promoting colonial objectives “would have been repugnant 
to the vast majority, given the Irish Catholic historical experience of oppression” 
(1990: 138). 
 
Irish missionaries certainly had an influence, however, on the construction of 
race in Ireland. Missionary magazines such as Africa and Far East, allied with the 
ubiquitous mission collection boxes in shops, pubs, schools and churches around 
Ireland, helped to develop the image of the ‘black baby’ in need of salvation. Writer 
Tim Pat Coogan commented: 
We were brought up believing that Africans as a class were much in 
need of the civilising influences of the Irish religions as parched 
earth was of water. It was an image propagated by missionary 
magazines with their pictures of a big beaming Irish priest, 
generally robed in white, surrounded by a group of adoring, chubby 
little black children (in Fanning 2002:16) 
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Other commentators have highlighted ongoing discrimination against Irish travellers, 
anti-semitism, and the stigmatization of white mothers of ‘mixed-race’ children 
(McVeigh and Lentin 2002:35) as evidence of home-grown racism. As Ireland has 
changed from an emigrant to an immigrant nation, examples of racist discourses and 
practices – particularly directed at blacks and at refugees and asylum seekers – have 
increased. The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism 
(NCCRI) provides evidence of these discourses and practices in biannual reports. 
Their most recent report highlights a range of racist assaults, abuse and harassment, 
and highlights incidences of racism in the delivery of public and private services, and 
in the circulation of offensive material (NCCRI 2004). At the same time, however, a 
range of community and voluntary organisations have been established in Ireland with  
addressing and combating racism. Integrating Ireland, an independent network of such 
groups, lists over 150 organisations, spread throughout the country, with the explicit 
aim of “working in mutual solidarity to promote and realise the human rights, equality 
and full integration in Irish society of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants” 
(Integrating Ireland 2005).  
 
Thus, the paradox exists that the Irish are both perpetrators and victims of 
racism. In the construction of racial hierarchies, Ireland is empowered by its 
whiteness, its Europeanness and its diaspora, but disempowered by its experiences of 
colonialism and of anti-Irish discrimination. For some, the experiences of the past are 
used as a rationale for racial equity and equality in the present. For others, the 
experiences of the present are used as a rationale for more restrictive and selective 
immigration policies, encouraging white and discouraging black migration to Ireland.  
 
PARADOX V: MOST IMMIGRANTS ARE WHITE, BUT MOST 
DISCOURSES ABOUT MIGRATION PRESENT IMMIGRANTS AS BLACK 
Most immigrants to Ireland are either returning Irish and their families, or 
citizens of other EU countries, most notably the UK. For the period from 1995 to 
2004, 45% of immigrants to Ireland were Irish and 30% were from the EU (over half 
of these were from the UK) (See Table 1). Despite this, public discourses about 
immigration have primarily focused on refugees and asylum seekers, who represent a 
small proportion of the overall number of immigrants (see Tables 7 and 8).  This is 
despite that asylum seekers and refugees coming into Ireland amount to only 10% 
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(approximately) of all foreign immigrants.  According to the CSO, between 1995-
1999 immigrants from outside of EU and the US accounted for only 10.5% of all 
immigrants (total numbers 21,800); this rose to 27.4% between 2000-20046 (total 
numbers 76,500), but is presently falling from a high of 29,900 in 2002 (CSO 2004) 
(See Table 1).  While the CSO has not released a breakdown of nationality of these 
figures, it is possible to get some idea by looking at the asylum seeker figures (see 
Tables 7 and 8).  These suggest that between a third and a half of non-EU or US 
emigrants per year are asylum seekers. 
 
<Tables 7 and 8 about here> 
 
Refugees and asylum seekers are often racialised as black, even though no 
accurate figures are publicly available to legitimate this claim. As a consequence, 
there is a widespread belief that Ireland is being ‘overrun’ by black immigrants 
(Cullen 2000), generally understood as asylum seekers. Fianna Fáil TD Noel O’Flynn 
voiced these sentiments in a speech in 2002, when he said that “the asylum seeker 
crisis was out of control” and that the country was being held hostage by “spongers, 
wasters and conmen”. Though denying his remarks were racist, O’Flynn claimed that 
putting large amounts of refugees from different ethnic backgrounds together was a 
“powder keg ready to explode” (in Spendiff 2002).7 It is important to acknowledge, 
however, that for many would-be immigrants from countries with substantial black 
populations, asylum represents the only chance “of getting in to Ireland, at least on a 
temporary basis” (Cullen 2000:19). Work Authorisations and Work Permits are 
predominantly issued to citizens of countries with substantial white populations, or to 
citizens of countries like the Philippines, which shares a Catholic heritage with the 
Republic of Ireland. Steve Loyal has commented that the DETE specifically targets 
and encourages immigrants from white Christian countries to fill job vacancies 
opened up by the Celtic Tiger economy (Loyal 2003). This racialisation of work 
permits is rooted in exclusionary ideologies that have attempted to regulate internal 
ethnic and religious diversity in the past (for example, by excluding ethnic minorities 
like Travellers, Jews and occasionally Protestants) and continues today by 
systematically excluding black populations (Loyal 2003). 
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In this way, there is a semantic association of black people with asylum 
seekers, and of asylum seekers with immigrants (White 2002:104). This is 
exacerbated by a seeming reluctance on the part of some government officials and 
media to separate issues of asylum and immigration, preferring instead to conflate the 
two. Instead, various moral panics ensue: about the ‘invasion’ of (black) asylum 
seekers (immigrants), and about the consequent abuse of Irish citizenship legislation 
and of Irish social welfare benefits (see Luibhéid 2004).  This gives legitimacy to 
practical actions that are both controlling and excluding: controlling racial and ethnic 
diversity – particularly through restricting black migration to Ireland and through 
imposing more stringent conditions on the granting of asylum – while at the same 
time managing and facilitating white migration. This has been particularly obvious in 
the state enforcement of immigration policy through deportation. Two groups of 
people are generally deported: those whose asylum applications were refused, and 
those whose parents’ applications for asylum were refused (though the deportees 
were, themselves, Irish citizens by birth). Deportation of people who have entered 
Ireland on holiday or work permits/visas and overstayed or violated the conditions of 
the visa is extremely rare.  It would be a mistake however to see the acceptability and  
‘taken for granted’ nature of these practices as manipulation from the top down – 
these processes have been successful precisely because they are building on already 
present xenophobic and racist sentiments (see Cullen 2002, McVeigh 2002a, Rolston 
and Shannon 2002). Policy discourse has thrived upon these anxieties. In this way, 
coercive state policies and everyday discriminatory practices in relation to the 
perceived invasion of unwanted black migrants are legitimised, allowing the 
government to prevent ‘black’ immigration while at the same time making it easy to 
import low-cost ‘white’ labour. 
 
PARADOX VI: POLICIES TO COMBAT RACISM AND PROMOTE 
INCLUSIVENESS CO-EXIST WITH POLICIES THAT PROMOTE THE 
EXCLUSION OF (SOME) ASYLUM SEEKERS AND IMMIGRANTS  
 
 
The Irish government signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1968, but did not ratify the Convention 
for 32 years, until December 2000 (McVeigh and Lentin 2002:6). The ratification of 
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CERD was one of a number of initiatives directed against discrimination and racism 
that were introduced in this period. The most significant were the introduction of a 
range of anti-discrimination legislation, and the establishment of government bodies 
charged with addressing these issues.  
 
The government had passed the Incitement to Hatred Act in 1989, which 
outlawed the incitement of hatred against people on the basis of their race, colour, 
nationality, religion, ethnic or national origins, or membership of the Travelling 
Community. Despite the existence of the Act, it was not effective in either preventing 
the incitement of hatred, or in sanctioning those involved in inciting hatred (Fanning 
2002:188). Later legislation was more effective: the Employment Equality Act of 1998 
serves to prohibit some types of discrimination in some public and private sector 
employment (Tannam 2002:197). The Equal Status Act of 2000 extends the 
prohibition on discrimination beyond the workplace, to the purchase of goods, the use 
of services, access to accommodation and participation in education. Together, the 
Acts prohibit discrimination on nine grounds, of which race is one. 8 In addition, a 
discussion document on a National Action Plan against Racism was published in 
2002. As well as introducing a range of legislative initiatives, the government also 
established two bodies with responsibility for monitoring these acts and for providing 
guidance on issues of equality, race and interculturalism. The role of the National 
Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), established in 
1997, is to act in a policy advisory role to the government, and to develop anti-racist 
programmes. The Equality Authority was established in 1999, and its role is to 
promote and defend equality rights. The NCCRI and the Equality Authority together 
act as the national focal points for RAXEN, the European Racism and Xenophobia 
Network. Membership of the EU has been instrumental in providing the impetus for 
legislative change with an anti-racist and anti-discriminatory agenda. The work of a 
range of voluntary and community groups has also been highly influential in 
developing an anti-racist agenda (Tannam 2002:196), and has complemented state-led 
anti-racist initiatives (McVeigh 2002b:219).  
 
However, state-led anti-racist initiatives co-exist with state-led racist 
initiatives, particularly in relation to policies directed against refugees and asylum 
seekers. From 1994 onwards, the numbers of people seeking asylum in Ireland began 
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to rise significantly, increasing from 139 in 1992 to a peak of 11,634 in 2002 (see 
Table 7). The government responded to this with a range of punitive measures. 
Legislative initiatives included the Immigration (Trafficking) Bill of 1999 and the 
amendment of the Refugee Act in 2000, which together served to make it more 
difficult to successfully claim asylum in Ireland, and to increase deportation rates. In 
terms of the treatment of asylum seekers, the government introduced a system of 
direct provision in April 2000, which limited support to basic accommodation, meals 
and cash allowances of IR£15 weekly for adults and IR£7.50 weekly for children 
(Fanning 2002:103). Asylum seekers were also dispersed outside Dublin to centres of 
direct provision, often local hostels and hotels commandeered for the purpose, and 
often in the face of widescale local opposition because of a perceived connection 
between asylum seekers, crime and disease.  And asylum seekers are regularly 
portrayed by politicians in negative terms: John O’Donoghue, the Minister of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, described asylum seekers as “illegal immigrants and as 
exploiters of the Irish welfare system” (in Fanning 2002:103).   
 
Bryan Fanning argues that “policies aimed at promoting inclusiveness and at 
contesting racism…co-existed with policies aimed at promoting the exclusion of 
asylum seekers from Irish society” (Fanning 2002:108). With recent legislative 
developments, his argument can now be extended. Policies aimed at encouraging 
immigrant labour now co-exist with policies aimed at limiting the rights of 
immigrants. In particular, the 2004 citizenship referendum removed the automatic 
right to Irish citizenship of anyone born in the country. Despite a broad coalition of 
organizations opposed to the referendum, it was passed by a margin of four to one.9 
While Michael McDowell, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform who 
introduced the referendum, claimed it was not racist, the coordinating body for groups 
opposed to the referendum disagreed. That group, Campaign Against the Racist 
Referendum, argued that if the referendum was passed “some children born here will 
be less equal than others because of their parents’ origins. Racial discrimination will 
be put into the constitution”.  
 
CONCLUSION 
What it means to be Irish and the discourse used to define Irishness have never 
been neatly defined.  As discussed, the colonial relationship to Britain, the legacy of 
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Protestant settlers and unionism, and the presence of a sizable Traveller population, 
have meant that Irishness in Ireland has always been contested.  Moreover, there is a 
long history of planned immigration and emigration, with policies and schemes that 
have delimited and regulated movements to and from Ireland.  As such, the discourses 
and practices being employed today to try and control who can move to, who can 
work in, and who can claim Irish citizenship, are new strategies and tactics in a long 
tradition of regulation.  The paradoxes we identify are striking and telling, however, 
because Ireland has undergone an economic transformation and has become a 
seemingly confident, cosmopolitan, prosperous state.  As a result, for the first time 
since the seventeenth century the country has experienced significant non-planned in-
migration.   
 
Today the hegemonic ‘soft focus’ construction of Ireland is one of a 
pluralistic, multicultural, liberal, cosmopolitan, open society. However, this 
construction is not as diametrically opposed to the rhetoric of conservative ‘old’ 
Ireland as it may first appear and occludes as much as it includes. The continued 
exclusion of non-conforming cultures (for example Travellers, gay and lesbian 
communities) not only from the imaginative spaces of Irishness but from fully 
participating in the normal round of social and political life and ‘immigration policies, 
which are straightforwardly aimed at deterring the entry of non-nationals’ reveal the 
sub-text of government policies (Loyal 2003:84). Ireland’s approach to 
multiculturalism is at best ‘minimalist’ – acknowledging and ostensibly tolerating 
cultural existence rather than actively engaging in real cultural exchange (Longley 
2001).  
 
Ireland’s confidence and cosmopolitanism is a mask hiding deeply etched and 
historically rooted anxieties and insecurities.  In its new prosperity, ‘commonsense’ 
Ireland has been quick to forget its own emigrant past and the hostilities and hardships 
Irish emigrants faced abroad as largely unwanted arrivals.  Instead, it has embraced 
the neo-liberal, right wing and racist rhetoric of much of Europe and North America. 
It wants immigrant workers, but it does not want them to stay if the economy 
experiences a down turn (unless they are skilled and from the EU or North America).  
It will tolerate a minimum of asylum seekers, but only if they are ‘genuine’ and they 
contribute in positive ways (i.e., as defined by the state) to Irish society.  It expects its 
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citizens to be able to move to and work in any part of the world, but not vice versa. 
These paradoxes are troubling, but the articulation of commonsense citizenship serves 
to dispel disquiet in the in interests of the common good of the state and its existing 
citizens. 
 
The power of the state and associated organisations and institutions rests, in 
this instance, in their ability to fix and police meaning, thus dismissing these 
paradoxes. However, the paradoxes we have identified carry with them an alternative 
form of political power, through their ability to disrupt fixity and certainty, and to 
challenge essentialising views of immigrants and of Irishness. This became apparent 
in a recent case, connected to the mass deportation of 35 Nigerians to Lagos in March 
2005. Among the deportees were 19 year old student Olukunle Elukanlo, and mothers 
Iyabo Nwanze and Elizabeth Odunse, who had left 4 of their children, aged from 8 to 
17, behind in Athlone.  Friends of many of those who were deported protested against 
the action, as had been the case for previous deportations. Unlike previous protests, 
however, one of these was successful. The Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, 
following protests by school students, overturned the deportation of Olukunle 
Elukanlo, who has now returned from Lagos with a 6-month student visa. Those 
people who opposed the deportations did so on the basis of ‘real people’: the people 
they had come to know, who had become members of their communities, who had 
become their friends. One quote from a recent Irish Times article sums this up. In 
relation to two of the women who were deported from Athlone: 
Their fellow student Claire Martin found them to be "very nice Christian 
women. They were very friendly, never a bother on them", she said. 
"Like many people I personally thought that these people were all 
spongers, getting free cars and tax and insurance. But then I got to know 
them and I said this and they cracked up. They thought it was hilarious. 
But it's no laughing matter." (Healy 2005) 
 
Following the deportations and the protests, a poll carried out for Ireland’s biggest-
selling newspaper, the Sunday Independent, suggested that 45% of the population 
thought the legislation on citizenship should be re-examined, and 61% felt the 
personal circumstances of all immigrants should be taken into account before 
applying deportation orders (Harris 2005).  
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The ideological employment of commonsense citizenship in Ireland mirrors 
similar experiences in other EU countries e.g. Denmark, Holland and the UK. The 
difference, in the case of Ireland, is a long and sustained history of out-migration, 
which continues today in the bodies of undocumented Irish in the US. “Take away the 
immigrants and their children, and the exiles and theirs” journalist Fintan O’Toole 
wrote, “and we have no Irish nation, no Irish culture, no Irish identity” (O’Toole 
2004). Through an acknowledgement of Ireland’s emigrant past, the personal 
circumstances of immigrants, the racialised construction of the immigration 
‘problem’, and the recognition of racist practices, the contradictions at the heart of 
‘commonsense’ citizenship are exposed, and possibilities for other, less restrictive 
understandings of citizenship and belonging are made apparent.   
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Table 1: Emigration from and immigration to Ireland, and net migration rates, 1995-2004 
 
 
 Emigration from Ireland   Source CSO, 2000, 2004    
            
To 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  
UK 13,300 14,100 12900 8500 11200 7200 7800 7400 6300 4900 93,600 
EU 5100 5100 4100 4300 5500 5500 5600 4800 4300 3400 47,700 
USA 8200 5200 4100 4300 5300 4000 3400 4800 2500 2800 44,600 
ROW 6600 6800 7900 4100 9500 10000 9500 8500 7600 7400 77,900 
 33,200 31,200 29,000 21,200 31,500 26,700 26,300 25,500 20,700 18,500 263,800 
            
            
            
 Immigration to Ireland         
            
Nationality 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  
Irish 17600 17700 20500 23200 26700 24800 26300 27000 17500 16900 218200 
UK 5,800 8,300 8200 8300 8200 8400 9000 7400 6900 5900 76400 
EU 3200 5000 5500 5800 6900 8200 6500 8100 6900 10600 66700 
USA 1500 4000 4200 2200 2500 2500 3700 2700 1600 1800 26700 
ROW 3100 4200 5500 4500 4500 8600 13600 21700 17700 14900 98300 
 31200 39200 43900 44000 48800 52500 59100 66900 50600 50100 486300 
            
            
 Net migration          
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  
 -2,000 8,000 14,900 22,800 17,300 25,800 32,800 41,400 29,900 31,600 222,500 
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Table 2: Population of Ireland (26 Counties), 1821 to 1961 
 
Year Population 
1821 5,421,000 
1831 6,193,000 
1841 6,529,000 
1851 5,112,000 
1861 4,402,000 
1871 4,053,000 
1881 3,870,000 
1891 3,469,000 
1901 3,222,000 
1911 3,140,000 
1926 2,972,000 
1936 2,968,000 
1946 2,955,000 
1951 2,961,000 
1956 2,898,000 
1961 2,818,000 
1971 2,979,000 
1981 3,444,000 
1991 3,526,000 
1996 3,627,000 
2002 3,918,000 
 
Sources: Irish Centre for Migration Studies, UCC http://migration.ucc.ie Accessed July 2005 and Central Statistics Office 
http://www.cso.ie/statistics/popn1901to2002.htm Accessed July 2005 
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Table 3: Irish net emigration and immigration, 1951-1986 
 
Period Net emigration Net immigration 
1951-1956 39,353  
1956-1961 42,401  
1961-1966 16,121  
1966-1971 10,781  
1971-1979  13,617 
1979-1981 2,523  
1981-1986 15,061  
 
 
Source: Irish Centre for Migration Studies, UCC. http://migration.ucc.ie Accessed July 2005 
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Table 4:  Work permits by sector: 1999-2004 
 
Sector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Service 3,010 6,538 14,018 15,068 16,965 14,571 
Catering 694 3,907 9,129 10,306 11,548 8,306 
Agriculture/Fisheries 449 2,963 5,714 6,248 7,242 3,721 
Industry 414 1,744 3,119 3,094 3,376 2,174 
Medical and nursing 721 1,353 2,252 2,883 2,709 2,469 
Entertainment 452 650 1,021 874 955 984 
Domestic 80 195 521 788 944 772 
Education 304 364 480 610 759 717 
Sport 60 118 121 153 227 207 
Exchange agreements  72 61 297 299 146 
 
 
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. http://www.entemp.ie/labour/workpermits/statistics.htm>, 
Accessed March 2005 
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Table 5: Total Work Permits issued 1999-2004 
 
Year New 
Permits 
Renewals Group 
Permits 
Total Refused 
1999 4,328 1,653 269 6,250 Not known 
2000 15,434 2,271 301 18,006 Not known 
2001 29,594 6,485 357 36,436 Not known 
2002 23,326 16,562 433 40,321 1,310 
2003 21,965 25,039 547 47,551 1,838 
2004 10,020 23,246 801 34,067 1,486 
 
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. http://www.entemp.ie/labour/workpermits/statistics.htm Accessed October 2004, 
March 2005 
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Table 6: Work permits issued and refused by nationality, 2002-2004 
 
Nationality 2002 2003 2004 
 Issued Refused Issued Refused Issued Refused 
Philippines 3255 78 4042 82 4301 152 
Latvia 3958 106 4160 58 1201 22 
Lithuania 3816 133 4551 76 1238 12 
Poland 3142 46 4808 76 1915 9 
Romania 2459 95 2527 213 2113 124 
South Africa 2273 34 2468 91 2031 77 
Ukraine 2092 45 2866 79 2137 95 
Brazil 1327 15 1554 78 1522 39 
Russian Federation 1238 58 1091 32 795 23 
China 1236 119 1593 161 1284 191 
Czech Republic 1138 30 1111 35 265 1 
Australia 1116 11 1149 12 908 9 
Malaysia 1086 8 1030 17 886 54 
Belarus 870 17 1028 33 760 42 
India 845 48 1030 88 1253 74 
Pakistan 840 122 830 239 846 118 
Estonia 820 40 1012 12 293 2 
USA 792 13 961 9 927 22 
Moldova 771 46 1043 48 849 39 
Bangladesh 767 24 1038 80 1009 95 
Bulgaria 753 39 868 31 721 27 
Turkey 155 7 466 6 1191 27 
Rest 5572 176 6325 282 564 226 
TOTAL 40321 1310 47551 1838 34066 1480 
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Table 7: Applications for asylum in the Republic of Ireland, 1992-2004 
 
 
Year No. of applications Top five countries of origin 
1992 39  
1993 91  
1994 362  
1995 424  
1996 1,179  
1997 3,883  
1998 4,626  
1999 7,724  
2000 10,938 Nigeria, Romania, Czech Republic, Moldova, DR Congo 
2001 10,325 Nigeria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia 
2002 11,634 Nigeria, Romania, Moldova, Zimbabwe, Ukraine 
2003 7,900 Nigeria, Romania, DR Congo, Moldova, Czech Republic 
2004 4,766 Nigeria, Romania, Somalia, China, Sudan 
  
Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner http://www.orac.ie Accessed October 2004, July 2005 
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Table 8: Asylum seeker country of origin (top five nations in any one year), 2000-2004 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Nigeria 3,404 3,461 4,050 3,110 1,776 
Romania 2,384 1,348 1,677 777 286 
Czech Republic 403   186  
Moldova 388 549 536 243  
DR Congo 358   256  
Ukraine  376 357   
Russia  307    
Zimbabwe   351   
Somalia     198 
China     152 
Sudan     145 
 
 
 
Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner http://www.orac.ie Accessed October 2004, July 2005 
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Notes 
 
 
                                                 
1 McDowell termed these immigrants citizenship tourists. 
2 An ongoing case relates to Turkish workers at Gama Construction. The company has been accused of significantly underpaying workers. 
3 Prior to EU enlargement, large numbers of permits were granted to citizens of Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and particularly 
Poland. 
4 The excerpt reads as follows: “They turned into Lower Mount Street. A few steps from the corner a fat young man, wearing a silk neckcloth, saluted 
them and stopped. ‘Did you hear the results of the exams?’ he asked. ‘Griffin was plucked. Halpin and O’Flynn are through the home civil. Moonan 
got fifth place in the Indian. O’Shaughnessy got fourteenth. The Irish fellows in Clarke’s gave them a feed last night. They all ate curry.’ His pallid 
bloated face expressed benevolent malice and as he had advanced through his tidings of success, his small fatencircled eyes vanished out of sight and 
his weak wheezing voice out of hearing.”  
5 Significant contributions were made by Margaret Cousins, founder of the Indian Women’s Association and the All-India Women’s Conference; 
Annie Besant, the first woman president of the Indian National Congress and the daughter of Irish parents; and Sister Nivedita (Margaret Noble), 
who was active in the early Indian independence movement (and influenced by Kropotkin) 
6 Year ends April. 
7 O’Flynn’s remarks did not appear to detract voters in his electoral constituency. He topped the poll in the general election in 2002, and afterwards 
was selected by Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, as chairperson of a Dáil Committee. 
8 The other grounds for discrimination are gender, marital status, family status, sexual orientation, religious belief, age, disability, and membership of 
the traveling community. 
9 Organisations opposed to the referendum included the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, trade unions such as the ATGWU, the Waterford Congress 
of Trade Unions and the Dublin Congress of Trade Unions, the Union of Students in Ireland, political parties such as Labour, the Green Party and 
Sinn Féin, the National Youth Council of Ireland, the National Women’s Council of Ireland, the National Traveller Women’s Forum and the 
National Lesbian and Gay Federation. 
